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A Watershed Event For a Watershed Community: 
The Development of Flood Control for the Santa Ana 
River Basin 
 
BY ADAM SCOTT MILLER 
 
ABSTRACT: Southern California receives the vast majority of its 
yearly rainfall in the relatively short time period between the 
months of December and March.  Occasionally, this intense 
rainfall creates floods that have historically threatened and 
devastated the communities of this region.  The twentieth century 
proved challenging for local flood control agencies.  California 
experienced tremendous population growth, resulting in migrants 
settling on the existing floodplains.  Unaware of the periodic, 
hidden menace, newcomers were ruined when rivers and their 
tributaries flooded.  It became clear that a significant change in 
flood control methods was required.  In 1936, Congress passed the 
Flood Control Act appropriating funds for flood control.  The 
Army Corps of Engineers took authority on flood control issues 
and began investigating the best possible solutions to assist 
communities like the Santa Ana River basin with the funds 
Congress authorized.  The Army Corps devised a plan that they 
believed, at the time, was sufficient to protect Orange County.  
However, in March of 1938 a major flood struck southern 
California and demonstrated the need for a larger comprehensive 
flood control program.  Ultimately, the affect of this program was 
the creation of immeasurable wealth for southern California.  
Property values increased, as did property taxes.  Land deemed 
unusable because of floods could now be utilized.  The creation of 
a modern comprehensive flood control program greatly aided the 
development of California’s economy—an economy which today 
ranks 8th in the world.  This is the story of the implementation of 
modern flood control in the Santa Ana River basin and the 
devastating storm that demonstrated the need for such 
extraordinary measures. 
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Southern California’s environmental faults are widely known; 
these include prolonged drought periods, intense earthquakes, 
destructive Santa Ana winds, and detrimental wildfires. Enormous 
storms capable of producing floods seem to be the least of southern 
California’s problems.  In fact, if these disasters are ranked 
thematically on the basis of concern today, flooding stands an 
excellent chance of causing the least amount of anxiety for the 
residents of southern California.  Yet, if this question were 
proposed 80 years ago, the flood nuisance would have caused the 
foremost alarm and panic for the residents during that time period.  
To prevent the annoyance of floods, the solution lay in updated 
flood control projects.  
Flooding was a way of life for the sparse population of 
southern California in the 19th century. At the turn of the 20th 
century, however, the Golden State grew in population to such an 
extent that those affected by floods increasingly pled for help.  
Because of rapid urbanization, it was difficult to maintain the 
balance between nature and civilization, and the encroachment of 
humanity into the floodplains was increasing. Policymakers were 
forced to decide whether or not to appropriate funds to develop 
long-term flood control projects.  In a semiarid region, flood 
control was only a concern when periodic intense rainfall occurred.  
Flood control was viewed advantageously by most officials but 
because floods only posed a temporary threat, the millions of 
dollars required to develop flood systems was considered 
impractical at that time.  Additionally, not much was known about 
the intervals at which flooding occurred.  In other words, floods 
happened unexpectedly and with varying strength; they could 
strike two or three times in a decade or twenty years apart.  
California’s lexicon categorizes floods into periods such as: 20-
year, 50-year, and 100-year floods. This means that, on average, 
within those specified time frames a particular sized flood would 
occur.  The infrequent flood, like the 100-year flood, resulted in a 
greater flood being produced than a flood that occurred during a 
20-year interval.  Because southern California covers thousands of 
square miles and has a diverse topography, a storm’s intensity 
could differ among the numerous regions within southern 
California resulting in differentiated flooding. In other words, the 





Los Angeles basin could receive heavier rainfall than the San 
Bernardino basin, causing a difference in flooding levels.   
Southern California’s large, diverse regions made 
implementation of flood control a complex issue that would 
require unique solutions to each particular basin. Therefore, it 
would be monotonous and tedious to discuss flood control on such 
a grand scale, but a condensed perspective will establish significant 
insight into the development of modern flood control.  This paper 
will focus on the Santa Ana River basin, which originates in the 
San Bernardino and San Gabriel Mountains and continues through 
San Bernardino, Riverside, and Orange Counties, and examine the 
critical role the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers played in managing 
and attaining flood works projects in a rapidly developing region.  
Ultimately, a comprehensive flood control plan was approved, 
providing a boost in usable land no longer subjected to floods.  
This increased property values, which brought a great deal of 
revenue back to the state in the way of property taxes.   
The term flood control is synonymous with the Army 
Corps of Engineers.  To truly grasp the birth of modern flood 
control a close investigative look is required of the Army Corps’ 
documents.  At what point did flood control become modern? 
Moreover, at what point did an aggressive approach to contain 
flood waters occur? Often in history, a defining moment or catalyst 
takes place that explains a sudden change in events.  This 
precipitating event took place in the month of March 1938 during 
the Great Depression. 
 The 1938 flood happened at a crucial point in history, 
bringing with it national attention and making the front-page 
headlines in many states’ newspapers.  In response to the 
widespread devastation encountered by southern Californians, 
Congress passed an additional flood control act directly benefiting 
the Santa Ana basin.  The 1938 flood effectively redefined flood 
control in southern California.  After the flood it was imperative 
that the flooding be managed, not only to protect the citizens of 
southern California, but for economic reasons. 
  This paper will show that the Army Corps of Engineers 
played a vital role in the design of flood control and persuaded 
lawmakers that short-term appropriations for flood works projects 
would result in long-term savings.  It will further argue that 
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modern flood control was seen as an investment for the 
government.  Flood control is a complex issue, spanning thousands 
of square miles and affecting different basin regions.  The limited 
scope of this paper will be confined to analyzing flood control 
efforts in the Santa Ana River region, which includes the Inland 
Empire and Orange County.  
 To comprehend the subject matter, a quick lesson in the 
history of California’s flooding problem prior to 1938 will be 
useful, as well as an overview of the role the Army Corps of 
Engineers played—and still plays—in society.  From that point the 
paper will focus on events prior to the 1938 flood, then discuss 
why the 1938 flood changed perceptions and led to modernized 
flood control.  Thereafter, the paper will delve into the construction 
advancements that took place after 1938, and then reveal the 
subsequent land-use benefits of flood control.  The implementation 
of a comprehensive flood control system is critical to explaining 
the development of southern California’s shift from an agricultural 
to industrial-based economy and the subsequent creation of 





Flooding occurs in southern California because of an uneven 
landscape. From the coastline, headed inland, the terrain gradually 
slopes upwards until reaching the transverse mountain ranges, 
which encompass the region and, thus, create a basin. In a mere 
70-mile distance, the elevation soars from sea level to peaks of 
over 10,000 feet.  The two most prominent mountain ranges 
affecting the Santa Ana basin are the San Bernardino and San 
Gabriel Mountain range. The San Bernardino Mountain range’s 
maximum height, at San Gorgonio peak, reaches 11,503 feet 
(3,506 meters).  West of the San Bernardino Mountains are the San 
Gabriel Mountains. The highest point is at San Antonio’s peak, 
also referred to as Mt. Baldy, at 10,068 feet (3,069 meters). The 
picture below gives an excellent example of the Los Angeles basin.  
The San Gabriel Mountains reach to the far right of the picture 
cutting off the San Bernardino Mountain range. 
 






Figure 1. Enhanced Satellite Photo from Jet Propulsion Laboratories (JPL) 
depicting steep transverse mountain ranges in comparison to the relatively flat 
land of southern California. 
 
 
Nevertheless, the enhanced satellite image, as a visual aid, 
illustrates the formation of a basin in relation to steep mountain 
ranges.  Notice the Los Angeles River right of center next to the 
L.A. Harbor as it makes its way to the San Gabriel Mountains and 
the Santa Ana River at the far right.  High elevations allow the 
water to run off quickly and then form natural waterways. These 
waterways or tributaries converge to form rivers like the Santa Ana 
and Los Angeles River.  Much like the ancient expression, “All 
roads led to Rome,” all the Inland Empire’s tributaries lead to the 
Santa Ana River, making it a formidable and potent river when 





When addressing flood control, the Civil Works project focuses on 
both the mainstream and lesser tributaries. For example, the Prado 
Dam, completed in 1941, is located at a choke point on the Santa 
Ana River, which restricts and minimizes water flow reaching into 
Orange County.  The Santa Ana River acts as an artery for water.  
It is a combination of all the water collected from its tributaries.  
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However, it is not the only factor contributing to regional floods.  
Flooding affects regions miles away from the Santa Ana River. 
Tributaries are the veins of the Santa Ana River and also unleash 
havoc on local residents. Case in point, the San Timoteo Creek is a 
tributary to the Santa Ana River.  The two converge near the I-10 
and I-215 freeways in the city of San Bernardino.  Even within the 
San Timoteo Creek other creeks converge on it like Wilson and 
Wildwood Creek.  When the region experiences heavy rainfall the 
San Timoteo Creek overflows its banks and/or undermines 
manmade levees, which leaves the residents of Loma Linda and 
surrounding communities in turmoil.  The photograph below 
depicts a large wave as it approaches the Anderson Street Bridge in 
Loma Linda during the February 1969 floods.1  
 
 
Figure 2.  Flood of February 1969.  “Wave action approaching Anderson Street 
Bridge” in Loma Linda, CA 
 
The example of the San Timoteo Creek illustrates how dispersed 
flooding can happen.  Floods are not confined to just the main river 
flow, but can also occur in the vicinity of the tributary.  Therefore, 
a comprehensive flood control plan needs to recognize and 
undertake projects for both the mainstream and tributary 
waterways in order to reduce the risk of floods. 
                                                
1 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles District, Flood Plain Information:  
San Timoteo Creek, Vicinity of Loma Linda San Bernardino County California, 
June 1973. Prepared for San Bernardino County Flood Control District, 35. 






Southern California’s Population and Flood History 
 
Southern California’s population began to change after 1900.  Only 
93,000 people lived in California just after the state gained 
admission to the union in 1850.  A half-century later that number 
rose to 1.5 million and by 1960 almost 16 million people called 
California their home.2  The 1920’s became a pivotal point for 
population in southern California.  The state’s population grew by 
2 million during that decade.  Most new migrants headed for 
southern California because of new employment opportunities in 
filmmaking, shipping, and manufacturing.3 Southern California 
saw another wave of migrants in the 1930’s and 1940’s as well.  
The Dust Bowl perpetuated the displacement of Midwest farmers 
in 1930’s and over a million came to find work in the fertile 
agricultural lands of California.4  The Pacific Front in World War 
II brought an abundance of vital defense industry jobs to help in 
the war effort.  Out-of-work citizens throughout the country were 
attracted to these new opportunities.  Even after the war, the 
defense industry beckoned newcomers to the state in search of 
prosperity.5  In 1970, the census confirmed that California’s 
population overtook New York as the largest in the union.6 The 
state’s tremendous population growth required officials to 
reexamine flood control.  As the population soared so did new 
housing, businesses, and other means of infrastructure to support 
an urban sprawl. This unprecedented growth meant more people 
and property were endangered when periodic flooding occurred.  
Prior to the 1938 flood, the 1916 flood showed the disastrous 
effects of a population encroaching on the flood plains. 
 The January 1916 flood was the first large event in the 
twentieth century for the Santa Ana River basin.  Two separate 
storm systems each produced six consecutive, intensive days of 
                                                
2 Larry N. Gerston and Terry Christensen, California Politics and Government:  
A Practical Approach. Ninth ed., (Belmont, CA: Clark Baxter, 2007), 6. 
3 Gerston and Christensen, 6. 
4 Gerston and Christensen, 6. 
5 Gerston and Christensen, 7. 
6 James D. Hart, A Companion to California (Berkeley:  University of California 
Press, 1987), 397. 
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rain that month.  In total, January 1916 had 19 days of rain.7  In the 
Santa Ana basin rainstorms of high intensity for short durations of 
time caused severe flooding. In 1916, according to the U.S. 
Weather Bureau, 16.71 inches of rain in a 24-hour period was 
recorded at a small hotel, named the Squirrel Inn, located near the 
crest of the San Bernardino Mountains.  The concentrated rainfall 
received at the Squirrel Inn demonstrates the tremendous 
magnitude of some southern California storms.8 Such intense 
rainfall swiftly descends to the base of the mountain and drains 
into the already-enlarged Santa Ana River. Furthermore, the total 
amount of water runoff is concentrated to a maximum of 20 square 
miles of drainage area, thus creating a flood.9  Even natural lakes 
such as Lake Elsinore overflowed.10 According to the Army Corps 
the magnitude of a 1916 flood happened only once in every 30 
years’ time.11  The total monetary loss due to the 1916 flood was 
estimated at $7,580,000 million.12  Four people in Orange County 
succumbed to the flood; in addition, five bridges were destroyed, 
electric and telegraph services were interrupted, and a gas line 
broke at the Chapman Street Bridge.13 In other regions, railroad 
tracks, roads, homes, and orange groves washed away.  Ontario, 
Redlands, Anaheim, and other communities remained isolated; the 
                                                
7 Colonel R.C. Hunter, Chief Engineer Los Angeles, 11/1/1946, “Report of 
Survey of Santa Ana River and Tributaries, California, for Flood Control,” 7; 
Santa Ana River (CA) SR Enclosures 1-8, 11-1-46; Records on the Office of the 
Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District Survey Reports 1935-1979, box 161; 
Record Group 77; Nation Archives Pacific Region, Perris, CA (hereafter RG 77, 
NARA).   
8 Major Theodore Wyman, Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District, April 15, 
1937, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the 
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif.”, 4; Santa Ana 
River, CA FC-Hydraulics April 15, 1937; box 160; RG 77, NARA 
9 Wyman, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the 
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif.,” 3. 
10  “Flood Control,” page 15; Santa Ana River, CA Flood Control July 1939 
[1/2]; box 160; RG 77, NARA. 
11 “Flood Control”, 20. 
12 Colonel R.C. Hunter, Chief Engineer Los Angeles, 11/1/1946, “Report of 
Survey of Santa Ana River and Tributaries, California, for Flood Control,” 12; 
Santa Ana River (CA) SR Enclosures 1-8, 11-1-46; box 161; RG 77, NARA. 
13 “Orange County Flood Control Report,” 4; Santa Ana River + other streams, 
CA 1937 (ENCL.) [3/5]; box 505; RG 77, NARA. 





flood eliminated all means of communication and transportation.14  
Disneyland, referred to as, “the happiest place on earth” would 
simply not exist in Anaheim if flooding persistently devastated the 
city. The picture below is an example of how the population coped 
with flooding.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
“Evacuating the Mexican quarter,  4th and Artesia, Santa Ana, CA.” 
 
 
The Role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
 
The Army Corps of Engineers plays a vital role managing Federal 
mandated projects, tracing their roots back to Chief Engineer 
Colonel Richard Gridley. In 1775, Colonel Gridley oversaw the 
fortifications for the Battle of Bunker Hill during the American 
Revolution.15 The Corps’ function has significantly increased over 
time.  The Corps’ primary focus was designing military 
fortifications, such as Bunker Hill and Fort McHenry, but 
gradually their responsibilities expanded in the newly developing 
nation.16  In the nineteenth century, the Army Corps continued to 
build fortifications, but also began surveying roads, canals, and the 
                                                
14 Colonel R.C. Hunter, Chief Engineer Los Angeles, 11/1/1946, “Report of 
Survey of Santa Ana River and Tributaries, California, for Flood Control,” 7; 
Santa Ana River (CA) SR Enclosure 1-8 11-1-46; box 161; RG 77, NARA. 
15 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:  A History 2nd Edition, U.S. (Alexandria, 
Virginia: Army Corps of Engineers Office of History, 1998), 1. 
16 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:  A History, vi. 
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western frontier. They oversaw the design and construction of 
monuments and buildings in the nation’s capitol.17 In the twentieth 
century, especially after World War II, the Army Corps turned 
their attention to non-defense activities focusing, for example, on 
shoreline projects. They engineered and improved major shipping 
harbors, in addition to smaller harbors used for pleasure craft.  
Developing harbors drastically changed the function of the Army 
Corp of Engineers.18 As a federal agency, the Army Corps’ 
primary focus was for the benefit of the nation.  Therefore, it was 
involved in the construction of interstate projects such as navigable 
waterways—not state and local projects, such as marinas.  
However, in 1932 Congress amended the River and Harbor Act of 
1902 to include the phrase, “’the use of waterways by seasonal 
passenger craft, yachts, house boats, fishing boats, motorboats and 
similar craft whether or not operated for hire.’”19 Slowly, the 
Corps’ authority reached to localized areas within a state, and was 
no longer restricted to projects spanning state lines where 
jurisdiction problems could occur.  The Army Corps steadily 
became the federal government’s authority on water, taking the 
responsibilities out of state and local hands.  From building 
harbors, marinas, and dams it would only be a matter of time 
before the Army Corps added flood control to their extensive 
resume.  
In 1936 Congress passed the Flood Control Act, which 
authorized the federal government to take responsibility for flood 
control activities.20 Instead of creating a new agency on flood 
control, Congress assigned the Secretary of War, who oversees the 
Army Corps of Engineers, to the task of building flood control 
structures.  The Act appropriated $320 million for 250 projects and 
surveys throughout the nation to boost the national economy.21 For 
the people living in the Santa Ana River basin, this meant help was 
on the way. 
  When the Army Corps began their investigation of the 
Santa Ana River basin, they quickly discovered the “deficiency” of 
                                                
17 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:  A History, iii. 
18 Turhollow, 77. 
19 Turhollow, 77. 
20 Army Corps of Engineers:  A History, 247. 
21 Army Corps of Engineers:  A History, 247. 





information compiled by local officials on the behavior of flooding 
rivers and tributaries.22  In essence, the Army Corps started from 
scratch without any previous knowledge of how much water 
flowed at a given point in the waterways.  In March of 1938, the 
Army Corps of Engineers was coincidentally blessed when they 
received their immense study case:  a rare 100-year flood. From 
that point on, the Army Corps took the lead role in a progressive 
flood control effort. Today, according to the Army Corp of 
Engineers, “[their] mission areas include planning, designing, 
building, and operating water resources and other civil works 
projects… providing immediate and long-term support to the 
public during natural disasters and national emergencies.”23 Thus, 
the Army Corps emerged as an authority on waterworks projects 
and continues to maintain their presence as a principal engineering 
organization in this field. 
The past acts as a window to the future allowing us to 
compare floods to one another.  A storm’s intensity is always 
variable and there is a great deal of uncertainty as to when another 
large flood will occur. In that regard, floods are very much like 
earthquakes.  Therefore, it is important for researchers to identify 
which flood was historically the largest, not necessarily in terms of 
the most destruction, but which flood created the most discharge of 
water.  Identifying this flood will give the Army Corps of 
Engineers a benchmark so they can, in turn, develop flood control 
to meet that point of reference. 
In an effort to better understand California’s past flooding 
the Army Corps began looking at prior reports delineating the 
different floods.  They turned to a report compiled on September 
21, 1931 named “Big Tujunga Creek” written by consulting 
engineer Franklin Thomas.24 The records indicated that 34 floods 
occurred in a period of 168 years, giving an average expectancy of 
one flood occurring in southern California every five years.25 The 
historical data Thomas used for his report was previous rainfall 
                                                
22 Army Corps Los Angeles District, “Flood Control,” page 53; Santa Ana 
River, CA Flood Control July 1939 [1/2]; box 160; RG 77, NARA. 
23 Army Corps of Engineers:  A History, iii. 
24  Survey Report, page 45; Santa Ana River, CA Flood Control July 1939 [1/2]; 
box 160; RG 77, NARA. 
25 Survey Report, page 45; Santa Ana River, CA Flood Control July 1939. 
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records, Mission Priests’ reports, and notes in explorers’ diaries.26 
The data also indicated that the flood of 1861-62 was considered to 
be the greatest flood on record.  A chart created by the San 
Bernardino County Flood Control District analyzes past floods by 
the amount of water that discharged through a place known as the 
Riverside Narrows.  The graph, below, clearly illustrates the 1861-
62 flood as being “off the chart” compared to other floods.  In 
addition, the 1862 flood had three times more water discharge 
through the Riverside Narrows than the 1938 study case.   
 
Figure 4.  The chart represents past discharge rates of water on the Santa Ana 
River at the Riverside Narrows location. 
 
The primary question arising from using this chart is:  How were 
these measurements gathered in 1862?  First hand witnesses wrote 
what they experienced during the flood:  
 
There were billows 50 feet high.  The waters from 
the vast drainage area found themselves forced 
                                                
26 Survey Report, page 45; Santa Ana River, CA Flood Control July 1939. 





abruptly into a narrow channel, and just above Agua 
Mansa the river filled the valley from bluff to bluff, 
reaching the little church.  Father Borgoatta, then 
the pastor, heard the roar in the distance, rang the 
bell frantically and the people fled to high ground.  
Some of the last ones had to swim. 
 
For scientists, the crucial part of the text is the description of the 
Santa Ana’s water flow reaching the “little church.” The church’s 
location was known when the Army Corp compiled their data.  To 
legitimize the story about the little church the Corps retrieved 
helpful information from Mr. Celso Robidoux, grandson of Louis 
Robidoux, an early settler of Riverside.27 In fact Louis Robidoux 
purchased the region known as Jurupa from a man named Don 
Benito Wilson between 1846-1848.28 Wilson, an early 
pioneer/mountain man, helped develop and soon became the 
second mayor of Los Angeles. The land he sold to Louis Robidoux 
was named Rancho Jurupa, part of greater Riverside, located in 
and around the city of current day Rubidoux and the location of 
Agua Mansa Mission, where the little church of San Salvador 
lay.29 30 The Corps’ documents state Mr. Celso Robidoux: 
 
Accompanied engineers to the site of Agua Mansa 
Mission and identified landmarks which had been 
pointed out to him in childhood by his parents, 
which then showed evidences of the 1862 flood.  He 
corroborated the high water level which of that 
flood at Agua Mansa as determined from other 
sources by the Advisory Committee on Flood 
Control in San Bernardino County, and told of the 
sweeping away of settlements and cultivated lands, 
evidences of which he saw in his boyhood.  The 
peak discharge of Santa Ana River at Agua Mansa, 
                                                
27 Tab 23, page 2; Santa Ana River+ tribs, (ENCL.) [1/5]; box 508; RG 77, 
NARA. 
28 Nat B. Read, From Mountain Man to Mayor:  Don Benito Wilson Los 
Angeles 1841 to 1878. (Santa Monica: Angel City Press, 2008), 40. 
29 Read, 40. 
30 Report, “History of Past Floods Santa Ana basin, Feb. 15, 1939, tab 23 page 
2; Santa Ana River + tribs., CA 1939 (ENCL.) [1/5]; box 508; RG 77, NARA. 
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computed by engineers of the agency referred to 
above, was 338,000 c.f.s. on January 22, 1862.31  
 
Other first-hand accounts gathered by the Army Corps for their 
report describe the following: 
 
In the town of Anaheim, four miles from the river, 
the water ran four feet deep and spread in an 
unbroken sheet to the Coyote hills, three miles 
beyond.  The inhabitants sought safety in the second 
stories of their houses, and those who were not 
fortunate enough to have an upper story quartered 
themselves upon those who had.  One unfortunate 
was carried down by the current and drowned.32 
 
The above story mentions that the floodwater was four feet deep 
four miles away from the Santa Ana River. The magnitude of this 
flood sounds astonishing, almost unbelievable to those that had not 
experienced a large flood.  The March flood would legitimize these 
incredible stories.  The rain that produced this flood started on 
December 25, 1861 and continued for 25 consecutive days, ending 
on January 18, 1862.33  The information the Army Corps of 
Engineers acquired from a reliable source about the 1861-62 flood 
establishes the benchmark that flood control structures would need 
to withstand. 
The above graph is also helpful when analyzing the 
outcomes of the 1938 flood; a flood that was pivotal in 
determining the levels of flood control necessary in southern 
California.  For example, no other flood after 1938 is equivalent in 
water discharge, but three floods prior to 1938 were equal or 
greater than the 1938 flood at the measurements taken at the 
Riverside Narrows.  This comparison illustrates how the old 
system of flood control became outdated and a new “modern” 
                                                
31 As a comparison, the Columbia River on the boarder of Washington and 
Oregon flows at a rate of 225,000 c.f.s. (cubic feet per second). 
32 Report, “History of Past Floods Santa Ana basin, Feb. 15, 1939, 3. 
33 San Bernardino County Flood Control History, 
http://www.sbcounty.gov/dpn/floodcontrol/history.asp (accessed on January 5, 
2010). 





approach was implemented, making a difference in the graph.  
These changes were necessary since a significant population 
growth was occurring in California.  
With a general understanding of the cosmetic makeup of 
southern California and past flooding history, in addition to 
comprehending the function of the Army Corps of Engineers, this 
paper will narrow its scope to examine the flooding events prior to 
1938 and analyze the Army Corps’ study on the Santa Ana River 
basin.  The Army Corps gathered evidence to demonstrate the 
benefits of flood control in the Santa Ana River basin. By no 
means does this paper suggest that flood control never existed in 
southern California.  In fact, local agencies attempted to subdue 
and channel water runoff for more than 80 years prior to 1937.34  
They built, maintained, and improved channels from time to time 
in order to manipulate the flow of water caused by seasonal rain 
for drinking and irrigation purposes. Despite these efforts, on 
occasion the flood menace struck and overwhelmed the manmade 
devices, crippling the swelling communities. The Army Corp 
classified these existing flood control structures to withstand floods 
of five to eight year intervals.35 Not until Congress authorized the 
federal government to finance flood control projects did the Army 
Corp of Engineers intercede on existing flood problems to find 
long-term comprehensive solutions for the benefit of the cities, 
states, and the nation.   
 
 
Flood Control Before the March 1938 Flood 
 
When the Army Corps of Engineers began their investigation into 
flood control in 1937 they asked district flood control agencies to 
compile reports explaining how they perceived flood control and 
the flood menace.  Flood Control Engineer for Orange County M. 
N. Thompson wrote such a report for the County Board of 
                                                
34 Major Theodore Wyman, Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District, April 15, 
1937, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the 
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif., page 10; Santa Ana 
River, CA FC-Hydraulics April 15, 1937; box 160; RG 77, NARA. 
35 Wyman, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the 
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif.,” 9. 
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Supervisors and the Army Corps.  His report reverted back to the 
impacts of the 1916 flood and stressed the future impacts on the 
Orange County area: 
 
Since 1916 the development of the District has 
proceeded at a rapid rate.  The population has more 
than doubled the assessed valuation [(property 
values)] has increased more than 300%.  More than 
half the present inhabitants have no personal 
knowledge of the area that would be overflowed or 
the resulting damage.  Intense cultivation, brought 
about by high returns from citrus fruits and other 
crops, has extended to land where flood waters once 
had the opportunity of spreading without causing 
much damage…The financial losses that would 
result under the present conditions, from a flood 
similar to that of 1916 would not only cause 
hardship to owners and residents of the lands and 
improvements directly concerned, but would affect 
the County as a whole.  Funds for the repair of flood 
damaged public property must come from taxes, 
and to make up the deficiency in tax returns from 
private property, reduced in value from flood 
damage, the tax rate on other property of the County 
must necessarily be increased.36 
 
Exponential population growth in southern California was the core 
problem according to Chief Engineer Thompson’s report.  A 
flood’s increasing capability of causing destruction is linked 
directly to the upsurge of population.  With every new flood, the 
damage becomes more severe and costly to southern Californians.  
For example, an Army Corps’ report reiterates these facts by 
providing additional evidence: 
 
The flood damage measured in dollars has increased 
somewhat out of proportion to the severity of the 
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several floods reported, owing to the extensive 
development that has taken place since 1862 and 
1884.  Over large areas in the cities and towns about 
30 to 60 percent of the ground surface has been 
covered by buildings, paved streets, sidewalks, 
etc.37 
 
As the population continued to grow and encroach on the flood 
plains of the Santa Ana River basin, it became apparent to officials 
that the region needed updated flood control structures.  The 
ongoing replacement of temporary wooden bridges, like those lost 
in 1916, had to change. Not necessarily because of the monetary 
loss, but the various counties’ increasing populations could no 
longer afford to lose crucial transportation infrastructure.38  This 
was especially relevant since America’s infatuation with the 
automobile began to materialize.  As a result, the need to control 
unpredictable floods became much greater than before.  Temporary 
wooden bridges would not suffice in the wake of the 1916 flood, 
which according to Army Corps “forced the thickly populated 
communities into quite serious circumstances.”39  Natural water 
channels proved too challenging to control.  When floods occurred, 
water overflowed its natural channels and created a new path to 
reach the ocean.  For the cities located in the Santa Ana River 
basin to further develop, the necessity of carefully engineered 
flood control devices was required.  A comprehensive approach to 
manage a multi-county problem fell to the hands of the Army 
Corps of Engineers. 
Under the 1936 Flood Control Act, Congress authorized the 
Army Corps of Engineers to take charge in surveying and 
developing flood control projects.  Before Congress appropriated 
money to the Santa Ana River basin, the Army Corps had to 
survey the land, suggest improvements, and analyze the region’s 
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economy and population. Army Corps Los Angeles District 
engineer, Major Theodore Wyman Jr. composed a report dated 
April 15, 1937 entitled, Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River 
and other streams, for the protection of the metropolitan area in 
Orange County, Calif., calling for Congressional approval to 
allocate funds for improvements on the Santa Ana River and its 
tributaries.40 Wyman asserted that his report was, “…submitted as 
a basis for consideration of plans for flood control works for the 
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, California 
authorized by Section 5 of Act of Congress, Public No. 738, 
approved June 22, 1936.”41  
From this point on, the Army Corps began to build a case 
on behalf of those affected by floods on the Santa Ana River basin, 
but only for those residents living in Orange County. His report did 
not include studies of Riverside or San Bernardino Counties where 
the Santa Ana River originates. Initially, Congress must have 
singled out Orange County specifically to protect from floods, not 
realizing the vast amounts of terrain that contributed to the flood 
problem. After investigating the causes of flooding in Orange 
County, Major Wyman concluded that the required protection 
Orange County (lower basin) needed would not even be located in 
the County itself, but upstream in Riverside and San Bernardino 
Counties (upper basin).42 Major Wyman immediately broadened 
the area of flood control on the Santa Ana River.  He argued that in 
addition to protecting Orange County it was necessary to consider 
the upper Santa Ana River basin, since past floods had caused loss 
of life and a significant destruction of property in that area as 
well.43  “In the upper basin, bridges have been destroyed, channels 
eroded, and debris deposited on the improved areas near the 
mountains; in the lower basin in Orange County the greatest 
damage has been from overflow, erosion and deposition of debris 
on large areas occupied by cities, towns and citrus groves.”44 Thus, 
the Army Corps Los Angeles District engineer Major Theodore 
Wyman was instrumental in incorporating Riverside and San 
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Bernardino Counties in a comprehensive plan for flood control 
along the entire Santa Ana River. 
The Army Corps’ 1937 report proposed that a crucial dam 
should be built in the upper basin of the Santa Ana River to protect 
Orange County.  The Prado Dam became the centerpiece of flood 
control along the Santa Ana River and essentially restrained the 
mighty river during major storms.  First proposed in April 1931 by 
Orange County Flood Control District’s general plan for flood 
control, the Army Corps of Engineers agreed with the dam’s 
location and adopted Orange County Flood Control’s method to 
contain floodwaters.45 The 1936 Flood Control Act allotted $13 
million for Orange County flood control projects, and the Army 
Corps recommended the appropriation of the funds.46 The Prado 
Dam would be completed in May 1941 for $9,450,000, as a result 
of the 1936 Flood Control Act.47 The remaining money was spent 
widening channels.  In addition, Chief Engineer Wyman believed 
$18,000,000 ($13.2 million federal and $4.6 million local 
contribution) was sufficient to establish flood works projects. 
However, the various county governments viewed flood control 
differently.  After Wyman’s report was released (1937) and days 
before the March flood, local agencies asserted their belief that 
$44,525,600 was required for full protection from the Santa Ana 
River and its tributaries above the Prado Dam site in Riverside and 
San Bernardino Counties.48 The subsequent flood affirmed for the 
local communities the need to suppress the flood menace. 
Another interesting aspect the Army Corps’ report 
examines is the monetary value of the regions they proposed to 
protect.  In 1937, were the areas affected by flooding in the Santa 
Ana River basin worth protecting?  Were they of enough 
sustainable value to warrant using federal money to ensure 
protection?  From 1940 to 1970 the southern California economy 
shifted from an agricultural to an industrial base.  Population and 
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property values soared and so did the need to protect them.  
According to Major Wyman’s 1937 report, the assessed value of 
land to be protected in San Bernardino was estimated at $111 
million; the highest of the counties affected by the Santa Ana and 
Los Angeles River.49 
 An important question arises when analyzing the Army 
Corps’ reports:  what is the correlation between the value of a 
county’s land and flood control?  Foremost, flood control is for the 
protection of the people.  A group letter composed by Major 
Wyman on January 25, 1938 titled, “Notice of Public Hearing” 
held on February 25, 1938 in Riverside, CA reiterates this fact.  In 
a list of requirements, bullet point “c” states, “The economic and 
other justification for the expenditures that may be entailed by the 
desired improvements, based upon:  Saving of life and protection 
to property, improvement to drainage, conservation of water, the 
development of power.”50 However, concern eventually shifted 
from a strict focus on saving lives and property to other beneficial 
factors—for example, how the government might benefit from 
investing funds in flood control.  At the heart of this argument are 
property taxes. 
  Visualizing the devastation the Santa Ana River basin 
experiences periodically, one can obviously see how floods hinder 
the government’s ability to prosper. The population in southern 
California was growing immensely during this time period and, 
therefore, it was presumed the economy of southern California was 
experiencing the same level of growth.  An investor could see the 
increasing prosperity as an investment.  The federal government is 
the investor and flood control is the investment. Yet, property taxes 
create revenue for state and local governments. How, then, does 
the federal government benefit from subsidizing flood control?  To 
elaborate, the basic function of Congress needs to be evaluated.  
The framework describing the Legislative Branch’s basic function 
may sound elementary, but is critical in order to comprehend the 
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federal government’s interests in flood control.  Congress is 
comprised of representatives from within a state.  The Senate 
serves the state as a whole and the House of Representative’s 
members serve the individual districts.  Representatives have a 
vested interest in their district.  By protecting areas from the flood 
nuisance, property values increase, thus benefiting their district.  
 Beginning with Major Wyman’s 1937 report, the Army 
Corps introduced direct and indirect benefits of flood control that 
soon became a major theme in flood control projects.  The Corps’ 
first report to Congress in 1937 briefly mentioned the increase of 
land values as a direct benefit of flood control. The Army Corps 
realized that if the Santa Ana River was tamed and disastrous 
floods occurred less frequently, then property values and property 
tax revenue would increase.  However, the Army Corps 
acknowledged that their investigative role in 1937 was to devise a 
flood control plan with $13 million—not analyze the benefits of 
flood control.  Nevertheless, the report states, “Although a 
comparison of economic benefits with economic costs is not 
considered necessary, because the works of improvement have 
been authorized by Congress, the following is submitted for 
purpose of record.”51 The report predicted that after new modern 
flood control improvements were completed, Orange County 
would experience greater security from flooding, thus increase 
property values by $480,000 on average per year.52 Furthermore, 
the report mentions a crucial indirect benefit when modern flood 
control is implemented for southern California. The 1937 report, 
with foresight reads: 
 
 In addition to the direct increase in value due to the 
removal of the flood menace, there would be an 
indirect benefit from additional future 
improvements in the area now subject to overflow, 
due to change to a higher use. These 
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changes…would create an increase in taxable 
wealth, not otherwise obtainable.  No estimates 
have been made   of the value of such indirect 
benefits.53 
 
Unbeknownst to Major Wyman, California’s growth would 
continue to multiply decade after decade nearly doubling between 
1950 and 1970.54 When the report was written just prior to the 
1940 census, California’s population stood slightly under 7 
million; according to the 2000 census California’s population 
reached almost 34 million residents.55 Today, California’s 
economy is ranked 8th in the world, which directly relates to the 
diversely skilled population.56 There is a direct correlation between 
California’s economy, flood control, and the ability to support a 
growing population.  Major Wyman’s report predicted an indirect 
benefit between flood control and future developments on the 
Santa Ana floodplain.  Land that was not usable prior to modern 
flood control would be utilized to house residents and support 
various businesses, thus creating incredible, taxable wealth.  With 
hindsight, the 1938 flood changed the perception of flood control 
on the Santa Ana River basin.  The 1937 report speculated on the 
possible damage to the region that could be caused by future floods 
of the magnitude of the one in 1916.  Their predictions can then be 
compared to the outcomes of the 1938 flood. 
 Floods are evaluated on two criteria:  magnitude and 
destructiveness.  To predict the outcomes of future flooding, both 
parts need to be evaluated separately.  Historically speaking, the 
two conditions are not interlinked.  For instance, the 1862 flood 
had the largest magnitude of any known documented flooding, yet 
the destructiveness was less than that of the 1916 flood, which had 
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a lesser magnitude.  The missing part in this equation is 
population. The Army Corps of Engineers needed to analyze all 
three factors to calculate damage from future floods.  Because of 
the intensive development of land on the Santa Ana River basin, a 
flood occurring in 1936 could be more destructive and, therefore, 
more costly than the 1916 flood, even if of a lesser magnitude.57 In 
their calculations, the Army Corps estimated a maximum probable 
flood on the Santa Ana River in Orange County of more than twice 
the magnitude of the 1916 flood.58   
 Under time constraints to submit the report, evidence had 
yet to be gathered to determine damages for Riverside and San 
Bernardino Counties.59  If a flood with the same magnitude as the 
1916 flood struck in 1936, the Army Corps estimated the damage 
in Orange County would be approximately $4 million.60 In 
addition, the hypothetical flood would, without a doubt, cause a 
loss of life between 40 to 50 residents of Orange County.61 The 
Army Corps’ initial investigation came to a close less than a year 
before the 1938 flood.  Their estimates of damages from a future 
flood in comparison with the magnitude of the 1916 flood doubled 
the amount of property damage and caused ten times the loss of 
life.  The flood experienced by the residents of southern California 
and studied by the Army Corps of Engineers forever changed a 
region decimated by periodic flooding.  
News spread throughout the Santa Ana River basin that the 
Army Corps of Engineers had begun a comprehensive 
investigation to improve flood control.  Local governments and 
water districts cooperated with the Army Corps by disclosing any 
information the Corps requested.  Moreover, local businesses 
submitted their perspectives and dilemmas when faced by floods.  
For example, in a letter dated February 34, 1938, days before the 
March flood, addressed to Chief Engineer Major Wyman, 
Pellissier Dairies in Riverside, gave their assessment of how the 
Santa Ana River affects the dairy’s operations. Pellissier Dairies 
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attempted to warn Major Wyman that if another flood like those in 
previous years occurred, not only would it result in a loss of life, 
but the Santa Ana River, at flood levels, would eat away the 
dairy’s property, hurting the business.62  
Another business affected by floods in the Santa Ana River 
basin was the Italian Vineyard Company located in Guasti, CA. 
Guasti is located slightly north of present-day Ontario Airport. In a 
letter dated February 24, 1938 the company stated that during 
floods, the Santa Ana’s tributaries, which passed through the 
property, slowly eroded parts of the vineyard’s immense 5,000-
acre property.63 The vineyard claimed, “ in order for us to put this 
property back in shape it will be necessary that we cut a straight 
channel through one hundred sixty (160) acres, putting us to quite 
a bit of expense.”64  What the letter fails to say but implies is that 
the vineyard wants the Army Corps to appropriate funds to build 
the concrete channel with federal money. Moreover, the letter 
recommended that the Army Corp not build a concrete channel 
from the foothills directly to the Santa Ana River, but to first add a 
“spreading area” or catch basin to allow water to sink underground 
and be conserved.65 
 In fact, most of the area’s drinking and irrigation water 
came from underground artesian well sources known as aquifers in 
the Santa Ana basin.66 M. A. Martinez, General Superintendent of 
Italian Vineyards and author of the letter, showed concern that if 
the Army Corps decided to build a concrete channel per his 
suggestion, water would not have a chance to percolate 
underground. Thus, the ability to conserve water in a semi-arid 
region would be diminished, as would the agricultural business.  In 
the region, water is a scarce commodity but also destructive when 
floods occur. Since most of the region was agricultural based, 
landowners depended on the slow meandering water flow, but 
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when the Army Corps proposed building channels to expediently 
evacuate the water to the Pacific Ocean, “much litigation resulted 
from the objections.”67 In summary, the balance between natural 
conservation and protective flood control needed to be reached. 
The Army Corp of Engineers held a meeting to discuss the 
problems arising from these multi-county dilemmas in Riverside 
on February 25, 1938, just days before the March flood. 
Riverside proved a halfway point for the areas affected by 
the Santa Ana River.  The public meeting allowed the numerous 
water agencies and businesses affected by floods to discuss their 
concerns about water rights.  In addition, they proposed their 
solution for flood control. An Army Corps 1939 report stated: 
 
According to testimony and data presented at the public 
hearing: 
 
At Riverside, California, on February 25, 1938, 
local interests desire that flood control 
improvements combined with improvements for 
maximum practicable water conservation be made 
in the basin of the Santa Ana River to provide 
protection to all localities now exposed to flood 
damage.  The improvements desired include seven 
reservoirs for reduction of flood peaks, and 
numerous debris basins, channel improvements, 
storm drains, and spreading grounds, the total cost 
of which, as estimate by local interests, is 
$44,525,600.  This cost is based primarily on the 
type of structure, which they considered adequate 
prior to the March 1938 flood.68 
 
In 1937 Major Wyman believed $18 million would provide 
“adequate flood control for the metropolitan area of Orange 
County,” but local officials believed the cost to be more than 
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double the Major’s estimate.69  A week later, the March flood 
reaffirmed the local agencies prediction.  All three factors 
determining the outcome of a flood were put to the test in March 
1938: magnitude, population, and destructiveness.  The results 
were astonishing.  The March flood became a wake-up call for 
change. The flood forced the Army Corp of Engineers to re-
examine how to implement a more powerful system of flood 
control. More projects were needed, and therefore stronger support 
from the federal government was required.   
 By March of 1938 preparations for a comprehensive flood 
control plan began to take shape. Congress approved eight crucial 
projects after Major Wyman’s April 15, 1937 report.70 Days before 
the rain began, concerned businesses implored the Army Corps of 
Engineers to help limit the potential damage that could be caused 
by the Santa Ana River.  The Army Corp of Engineers and 
Department of Agriculture organized a meeting in Riverside, 
February 24, 1938 attended by the counties who had a vested 
interest in the Santa Ana River.71  The counties were brought 
together to discuss a comprehensive approach to flood control, to 
talk about concerns, find solutions, and resolve their differences.  
However, the litigious nature of feuding counties over water rights 
caused delays in building flood control structures. The various 
counties’ flood control agencies had a grander approach to flood 
control than the novices at the Army Corps of Engineers, yet it 
required the involvement of the Army Corps to put a 
comprehensive plan in place.  This lack of coordination between 
counties was presumably rooted in cross-county suspicions.  
 Orange County’s fix to the flood lay in Riverside 
County—with the construction of Prado Dam—and this caused 
anxiety between the two counties. Why would Orange County pay 
for a dam not even located in their county? On the other hand, 
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what purpose would the Prado Dam serve for Riverside County? 
The purpose of the dam was to restrict the flow of floodwater by 
allowing it to collect behind the dam and then regulate its 
discharge into Orange County. Once Federal authorities took 
jurisdiction on the matter, disputes between county authorities, 
such as the dispute between Orange and Riverside Counties over 
the Prado Dam, disappeared.  The Army Corps provided the 
necessary funds (appropriated by Congress) which neither county 
wanted to appropriate for the construction of Prado Dam.  Changes 
in flood control began slowly, but made progress. On February 27, 
1938 rain began to fall over a fearfully concerned region abused by 
floods.  The resulting March flood would accelerate the 





The March flood will be discussed in several different ways.  The 
first goal is to focus on the basic facts of the storm.  The magnitude 
of the storm is crucial because it illustrates the intensity needed to 
produce a catastrophic flood. The second objective is to analyze 
the human impact of the flood vis-à-vis the destruction and loss of 
life caused by the flood.  The widespread devastation affected 
every county in southern California.  Newspapers in various states 
ran front-page stories, which informed their readers about the 
horrors faced by the residents. The March flood demonstrated to 
the nation the need to protect the growing state of California.  
Finally, the Army Corps studied the flood to see how the Santa 
Ana River basin behaves during such events. Their investigation of 
the March flood changed the Army Corps’ perspective on flood 
control. The original eight project plan proved insufficient for the 
Army Corps.  A new, extensive investigation began as a result of 
the 1938 flood. 
  Three separate storms brutalized the southern California 
landscape beginning February 27 and ending March 3, 1938. 
According to the Los Angeles Weather Bureau, the intensity 
increased between each storm.72 The greatest recorded rainfall 
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during the storm period was 32.2 inches at Kelly’s Kamp in the 
San Gabriel Mountains: 17.55” fell in a 24-hour period.73 In 
addition, the average rainfall in the mountain ranges varied 
between 20 and 30 inches.74  San Bernardino received 5.47”, 
Riverside reported 5.26”, and Anaheim collected 8.63” over the 
four-day period.75  The severity of the flood reached its pinnacle on 
the last day because a warm tropical air front brought tremendous 
rainfall and raised the altitude of snowfall.76  The Santa Ana River 
and its tributaries absorbed 56 percent of the mountain and foothill 
run-off above the Prado Dam site, raising the water table, but they 
reached their breaking point when the final storm unleashed its 
power.77  Harold Willis, former president of San Bernardino’s city 
Water Board and eyewitness to the March flood at age eleven was 
quoted in the local newspaper in 2003 claiming, “We had this cold, 
cold winter… the snow stacked up and stacked up.  Then we had 
this warm rain come in from the south.  The snow was like a huge 
sponge.  It caught all the water and could hold no more, and it 
turned to slush and just came right on down.”78 As a result, the 
tributaries overflowed and levies breached on the Santa Ana River 
causing widespread devastation and loss of life.  
 The heavily saturated mountains brought down untold 
amounts of debris.  Debris included, silt, rocks, and foliage, which 
covered many parts of the counties.  The Lytle Creek community 
located on the San Gabriel Mountain side of the Cajon Pass 
received incredible damage. A mountain community named after 
the tributary, Lytle Creek, washed away 200 cabins tearing the 
community apart.79  At the Lytle and City Creek, and Santa Ana 
River junction lays the communities of San Bernardino and Colton 
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where the flood destroyed between 200 and 300 homes.80  In San 
Bernardino County a hundred bridges collapsed and two miles of 
railroad track were undermined, crippling the rail system.81 The 
flood not only brought quick moving destructive water, but vast 
amounts of debris that adversely affected the communities.  The 
Army Corps gathered hundreds of photos of the Santa Ana River 
and tributaries flooding devastation and compiled them in a report 
titled “Photographs of Damage from Storm of February 27-March 
3, 1938.”82 The photos themselves provide an excellent pictorial 
record, capturing the detail and widespread damage incurred by the 
March flood.    
 
 
Figure 5.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
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Figure 6.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
“Upstream view of damage in Lytle Canyon at 17.8 miles below Glenn Ranch, 






Figure 7.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
Photo taken 3/3/1938. Merging point of Lytle Creek and Santa Ana around the 











Figure 8.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
Photo taken 3/3/1938 View from Orange County looking west.  Notice the 





Figure 9.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
Photo taken 3/3/1938. View from Orange County looking west.   









Figure 10. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside. 
Picture was taken 3/3/1938 by the Army Corps illustrates widespread flooding 
over Northern Orange County looking northwest. Notice the flood waters 
reflection-covering most of the County. 
 
The 1938 March flood devastated southern California.  
These images are just snap-shots of the areas affected by the Santa 
Ana River and its tributaries, but the flood’s destructiveness 
impacted the Los Angeles community as well.  Total damage and 
loss of life figures vary depending on which source one examines.  
The San Mateo Times headlines on March 4, 1938 read, “Death 
Toll Now Near 250.”83 The Nevada State Journal claimed 400 
dead on March 6, 1938.84 In recent years the death toll is still 
debated.  An article appearing in The Press-Enterprise indicates 
that the number of dead was at least 175 people, but recognizes 
that the “death toll is difficult to pin down.”85 The reporter refers to 
Suzie Earp,86 who at the time (2003) was a master’s student at 
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California State San Bernardino, “it’s hard to know…just how 
many people died…’this was the Depression…and a lot of people 
were camped out by the river.  We don’t have any official 
numbers.’”87 In addition, to the above statement another perception 
arises to help uncover the reasons why an official death toll was 
not sought after.  An article written by the Nevada State Journal on 
March 6, 1938, about the southern California flood, reveals the 
racial attitudes of the time period.  The article reads, “The Red 
Cross spokesman said:  ‘You must realize that most of the dead are 
Mexicans, and when one of their race disappears, they are not 
likely to report the disappearance.’”88 This quote is a prime 
example of racial stereotyping during that era.  Therefore, it can be 
assumed organizations like the Red Cross may not have fully 
investigated the specific total of causalities caused by the flood 
because of racial indifference.  
 Another aspect of flood damage is the monetary costs of 
such an event.  These numbers too vary depending on the source.  
The City of Ontario, CA Risk Management department currently 
compiled historical data estimating $78,602,000 in damages and 87 
deaths resulted from of the March 1938 flood.89  The Army Corps 
of Engineers estimated the direct and indirect damages at 
$48,133,278 in 1939.  Today (2010) that converts to approximately 
$740 million.90 The Army Corps figure of $48 million is twelve-
times greater than their 1936 prediction of $4 million. Even though 
the Army Corps calculated their predictions to a 1916 caliber 
flood, the 1938 flood was not twelve-times the magnitude (see 
figure 3).  The numbers vary between the death toll and financial 
loss incurred from the March flood.  Either way, the storm’s 
magnitude and destructiveness changed perceptions on flood 
control.  This is illustrated in newspapers articles at the time of the 
1938 flood. 
News of the flood prompted various newspapers to run 
headlines informing their readers of the devastation in southern 
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California.  The New Castle News in New Castle, Pennsylvania ran 
a front page headline in bold print “CALIFORNIA HIT BY 
FLOOD:  Estimate 45 Dead As Waters Sweep Over Part Of 
State.”91 Freeport Journal-Standard of Freeport, Illinois headline 
in bold writing read “FLOOD LOSS MOUNTS IN 
CALIFORNIA,” the article describes the number dead or homeless 
and the untold millions in damages.92  The natural disaster even 
caused social upheaval.  For instance, the San Mateo Times on 
March 3 ran a headline “L.A. Looting Starts.”93 Then on March 5, 
1938 the headline read “L.A. Issues Orders To Shoot Looters.”94  
The same article also describes the problems communities like 
Riverside had over contaminated water for drinking purposes and 
“stagnant, disease-breeding pools” of water.95 Corroborating the 
story, The Hayward Review on the same day ran the headline, 
“Disease Perils Flood’s Victims:  Town’s Drinking Water 
Condemned.”96 Communities were isolated due to the flood.  The 
Santa Fe Railroad traffic came to a halt because either their tracks 
washed away or fell victim to landslides, thus cutting off 
supplies.97 Means of communication were severed as power lines 
gave way. The devastation felt by southern Californians and 
reported through various newspapers across the nation informed 
readers of the growing problem of the flood menace in southern 
California. The need for a modern flood control system, capable of 
withstanding floods like that of March 1938, became imperative. 
 
 
After the March 1938 Flood:  A Lesson Learned 
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A newspaper in Alberta, Canada, The Lethbridge Herald on March 
24, 1938 criticized Los Angeles as having a “lack of flood control” 
and moreover argues that; “…monies Los Angeles City and 
County will have to find to develop flood control projects to 
prevent flood damage in the future!”98 What the article did not say 
was that flood control did exist, but was insufficient.  The Army 
Corps had already began establishing ideas for a comprehensive 
flood control system, but in the wake of the March flood they and 
other experts realized they had underestimated the extent of 
construction projects needed.  The Army Corps began to pressure 
the federal government to appropriate additional funds for flood 
control.  On June 28, 1938 Congress modified the Flood Control 
Act of 1936 to provide an addition $6,500,000 for a ninth 
construction unit that would control floods on the San Antonio and 
Chino Creeks.99 Yet, shortly after Congress’s decision the Army 
Corps compiled a new report that analyzed the information 
gathered from the March flood. Their proposed plan in 1936 
proved insufficient.  The report reads: 
 
The plan of improvement in the approved project 
for San Antonio-Chino Creeks…is the only one in 
the Santa Ana River above Prado that is considered 
adequate for the flood protection of the areas 
subject to damage from floods.  The estimates for 
all other basin subdivisions considered in this 
enclosure are based on the type of structures 
considered adequate by local interests prior to the 
March 1938 flood.  It is evident that these structures 
and therefore the respective estimates are 
inadequate.  A survey will be required to determine 
the improvements that should be included in a 
comprehensive plan for flood control on the Santa 
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Ana River and tributaries, together with estimates of 
cost.100 
 
Major Wyman submitted a preliminary report on February 15, 
1939, which nearly negated all previous assumptions to provide 
adequate flood control.  His report explained how the March flood 
was a learning lesson for the Army Corps and local water 
authorities: 
 
As a result of this flood, local engineers and 
interested parties within the basin believe that the 
improvements sponsored at the public hearing are 
inadequate to provide the desired protection and 
that improvements which will provide such 
protection would cost considerably more than the 
amount estimated [$44,525,600] by them and as 
presented at the hearing [February 24, 1938]… 
Plans upon which this estimate was based were 
prepared by local interests prior to the flood of 
March 1938, and as has been explained, local 
interests now believe that their original plans would 
be inadequate and that the total cost of adequate 
improvements would be considerably more than the 
amount mentioned above…$69,000,000, it is 
believed that most of the improvements desired by 
local interests may be warranted.101 
 
However, Major Wyman’s 1936 report “concludes that the 
essential features for adequate flood control…can probably be 
accomplished within the limits of funds authorized,” $18 million in  
total.102 In three years time Major Wyman perspective changed 
dramatically. Adequate flood control now “warranted” $69 million 
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to develop flood control structures for the Santa Ana River basin.  
Furthermore, local interests realized their estimates fell short for 
adequate flood control.  The March 1938 flood demonstrated a 
change in attitude toward a modern flood control system.  Before 
1938, it was clear to the people that a flood problem existed.  After 
March 1938, it was evident that a serious flood problem existed 
that would require tens of millions of dollars to correct.  
Subsequently, Congress authorized a multitude of appropriations 
under Flood Control Act103 after the March flood.104  In the wake 
of another disastrous flood in 1969, Congressman, 33rd District 
Jerry Pettis wrote in the Montclair Tribune, “The 1938 flood 
triggered the construction of $38,700,000 in federal and local 
projects in our country, all designed to prevent a repetition of that 
disaster.”105 After the March flood the Army Corps quickly began 
surveying the land to find new solutions to prevent another 
disaster. 
Immediately after the storm the Army Corps thoroughly 
investigated the extent of the damages from the March flood.106  
They took aerial photos, conducted interviews with property 
owners, and wrote field surveys to determine the total damages 
caused by the flood in addition to studying how floodwaters 
behaved.  These surveys are evident in the above photographs of 
the March flood.  Hundreds of additional photos were part of 
Major Wyman’s May 28, 1938 report on the March flood.  The 
preliminary report by Major Wyman in February 1939 outlines the 
direct and indirect damages of the March flood and specifies which 
tributary caused what damage.  This helped the Army Corps 
classify which areas were at the greatest risk of destructive damage 
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at the time.  The most volatile areas affected by floods were 
investigated to find solutions to prevent future devastation.  
Another important lesson learned was the behavior of water.  A 
July 1939 report established a conundrum to southern California’s 
flood problem.  To control floods, construction of additional 
channels and storm drains were needed to prevent flooding in 
localized areas. However, these channels allowed water to quickly 
flow downstream at concentrated levels, straining levies 
downstream in Orange County.  When a storm’s intensity hits the 
hardest it creates a surge of water funneling downstream, resulting 
in overflow or broken levies. In support of improved or concrete 
lined channels, they allowed the water to move as one continual 
mass, which allowed for a smaller storage capacity.  In other 
words, concrete channels were useful in some places, but not 
others.  Upstream dams or reservoirs would collect water even 
during intense periods to minimize high concentration 
downstream.  Prado Dam is a key example.   
After the March flood, the Army Corps sought out new 
locations for dams or reservoirs.  In addition to dams and 
reservoirs, spreading grounds would also be utilized.  Spreading 
grounds are located at both the foothill of a mountain and at the 
canyon’s mouth.  Their purpose is to disperse water as it flowed 
out of the canyon mouth, thus slowing down the water’s velocity. 
Moreover, spreading grounds could catch much of the debris that 
devastated most of the Santa Ana basin community.107 Also, 
spreading grounds allowed water to seep underground, which 
helped replenish the aquifer.  The picture on the next page is an 
example of one spreading ground utilized in the Santa Ana River 
basin.  In today’s standards, spreading grounds require an 
enormous amount of valuable land, but their benefits far outweigh 
the disadvantages. Thus, spreading grounds act as a buffer during 
intense rain periods and help solve 
a variety of problems pertaining to debris, floods, and water 
conservation.  Dams and reservoirs also became a tool of flood 
control. 
  The solution was not as simple as building a concrete 
channel or a single dam as the Army Corps first had intended.  A 
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study case was required to comprehend how flooding waters 
behave.  Then the Army Corps could take their findings and 





Development of adequate flood control structures is a learning 
process. The Army Corps learned tremendously from the March 
1938 flood, but their system was not bullet-proof.  In other words, 
other floods had to occur to put these improvements to the test.  
Besides, Army Corps historian Anthony Turhollow states, “LAD 
[Los Angeles District Army Corps] and local agencies have barely 
kept pace in providing necessary flood control works to protect the 
momentous growth of population and industry in southern 
California.”108  
In January and February of 1969, two large storms 
comparable to the March flood struck the region.  Depending on 
one’s viewpoint, flood control was either a success or a failure.  
The City of Ontario Risk Management report claimed the two 
floods created the most damage of any previous flood on record.  
Damage in San Bernardino County was estimated at $54 million 
and caused at least 13 deaths.109 “Nineteen inches of rain fell in 
Ontario over a 24-hour period.”110 For historian Anthony 
Turhollow, success or failure of flood control does not depend on 
the damages and costs of the flood, but how much money was 
saved and damage was prevented as a result of flood control.111 
“The system more than paid for itself by preventing more than $1.5 
billion in flood damages and preventing the loss of many lives.”112 
Former Los Angeles County Board Supervisor Frank G. Bonelli 
stressed “in 1969 that ’the overall flood control system prevented 
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one of the worst catastrophes in the history of Los Angeles 
County.’”113  
Today, southern Californian’s experience a near worry free 
environment as compared to those who lived here in the early part 
of the 20th century.  Many residents probably never realized that 
southern California has a flood problem.  Truth be told, we still do 
not understand completely.  The Army Corps of Engineers and 
local water districts are continually improving flood control.  
 In 1979, the Army Corps realized flood control was 
insufficient on the Santa Ana River.  The Prado Dam was targeted 
for improvement.  Increased urbanization downstream and a 
stronger understanding of the Santa Ana basin hydrology led the 
Army Corps to conclude, “that a greater degree of protection than 
the dam now affords is needed.”114 Their recommendations 
required raising the dam by 30 feet and increasing the output 
release of water from 5,000 to 30,000 c.f.s.115 The work proposed 
in 1979 was finally completed in recent years.  Another major 
project for the Army Corps of Engineers was the Seven Oaks Dam 
in Mentone, CA.  The dam is located in the foothills at the canyon 
opening of the Santa Ana River.  Compared to Prado Dam, the 
Seven Oaks Dam dwarfs the 1938 flood control centerpiece.  The 
Mentone Dam was first mentioned as a future construction 
endeavor in 1979 and the Army Corps began construction of the 
Seven Oaks Dam (Mentone Dam) in September 1995.116 117 
Completed in 2000 the Seven Oaks Dam measures 550 feet high 
and 2,980 feet across and was built at a cost of $420 million.118 
The Seven Oaks Dam became the centerpiece in a renewed effort 
to provide greater protection for the Santa Ana basin community.  
Almost $1.4 billion was appropriated in 1986 to re-modernize 
flood control along the Santa Ana River and its tributaries.119  
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 Is spending an additional $1.4 billion on flood works’ 
projects justified?  Does the cost outweigh the benefits?  For those 
who remember 1938, the money was well spent.  Just as the March 
1938 flood illustrated to the Army Corps the dire need for a serious 
approach for flood control, the floods of 1969 demonstrated the 
constant need for flood control improvements.  The solution 
became the $1.4 billion program to prevent possible future loss of 
life and damage.  Anthony Turhollow indicates the same attitude 
toward flood control, “Because floods sometimes do not occur for 
a number of successive years, the question of the need for a flood 
control system is invariably raised.  However, when the inevitable 
floods do occur, then public appreciation for the foresight of 
engineers is openly and gratefully manifested.”120 The benefits of 
flood control are not limited to the protection of life and property, 
but are indirectly linked to increased wealth and taxes. 
 
 
Uncovering the Indirect Benefits of Flood Control 
 
Since adopting a proactive approach to flood control after the 
March 1938 flood, southern California’s available land use has 
spread remarkably.  As discussed earlier, Major Theodore Wyman 
introduced the direct and indirect benefits of flood control as a side 
note in his April 15, 1937 report.  After the completion of the 
Army Corps proposed projects, to a certain extent floodwaters 
could be contained.  Colonel R.C. Hunter in a November 1, 1946 
report illustrated that the Army Corps shifted its focus to analyzing 
benefits of flood control in addition to flood control improvements.  
The report reads: 
 
A study of growth in population and of business and 
industrial trends indicated that as a result of future 
development the total average value of residential, 
business, and industrial property in the overflow 
zones during the next 50 years, 1947-96, generally 
will increase 50 percent and that the total average 
value of highway property and public utilities, 
including sewers and water systems, generally will 
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increase 30 percent. Property values were estimated 
on the basis of prewar (1940) conditions.  Based on 
1946 replacement costs, present property values are 
estimated to be from 50 to 100 percent greater than 
prewar values.  The 1940 true value of nonmilitary 
property in the principal overflow zones is 
estimated at $167,213,000, including $55,864,000 
for residential, business, and industrial property, 
$68,080.000 for agricultural property.121 
 
Over time, flood control allowed an increase in property values, 
and a corresponding rise in property tax revenue.  Local 
governments, such as the County of San Bernardino, realized the 
positive impacts of flood control.  A Board of Supervisors meeting 
held on December 22, 1947, urged the federal government to 
embark on new flood control improvements. By law, local interests 
have to fund a portion of flood control improvements.  Yet, the 
recorded minutes illustrated that the local interests were willing to 
contribute their portion of funds to lure Congress to contribute 
monies for new channel improvements: 
 
Minutes of the Board of Supervisors of San 
Bernardino County acting as ex-officio Board of 
Supervisors of San Bernardino County Flood 
Control District” meeting held December 22, 1947. 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that, if the above 
described channel improvements be authorized by 
the said Congress, then the San Bernardino County 
Flood Control District, to the best of its ability, will 
assist the Federal Government in undertaking said 
flood control improvements by assuming the 
following obligations, to-wit:  
(1) Those non-Federal contributions, which are 
required by Federal laws. 
(2) In addition---and in recognition that property 
values would be increased by the improvement with 
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increased utilization of the land protected from 
flooding --- and if such payment shall be required 
by Congress in authorizing the improvement, 
contribute $200,000.00 of the first cost of the 
project.122 
 
The crucial part of this document is that it does not state that flood 
control improvements are for the protection of the residents; 
instead the supervisors recognize the land use and property 
benefits only. Then the Board entices Congress to appropriate 
funds, because they have already agreed to provide the county’s 
financial contribution for flood control.  As a hypothetical 
question, this type of behavior can also breed corruption in local 
governments worthy of investigation. If property values are low 
because its location is on a floodplain and local officials knowingly 
ask for improvements that will undoubtedly increase property 
value, one could buy the land cheaply before the flood control 
improvements are made and then later and sell it for a substantial 
profit. 
   Examples of increased land use can be seen throughout 
southern California.  The City of Yorba Linda is a prime example 
of floodplain land that is utilized for residential and business use. 
Below is an illustration, using Google Earth, of the current 
development that has taken place in the City of Yorba Linda. The 
other is a photograph that was taken by the Army Corps during the 
March 1938 flood.  The two are taken from virtually the same 
perspective.  Compare the Santa Ana River’s size while in flood 
and the land developments that have taken place. Clearly, the 
untold wealth Major Wyman noted in his April 1937 report was 
discovered. Thus, flood control allowed for future developments 
on the floodplain creating an immeasurable amount of wealth. 
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Figure 11.  Image Captured from Google Earth.  City of Yorba Linda as of 
2010:  Note the Arrow pointing to Yorba Bridge.  The blue line marks the path 
of the Santa Ana River. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at 
Riverside.  Photo taken 3/3/1938. View looking northeast on Santa Ana River.  
Note the arrow pointing to Yorba Bridge.  Compare the two photos, the size of 
the Santa Ana River and permanent developments encroaching on the floodplain 
as to agricultural land. 








The question as to whether the region was worth protecting from 
flooding might sound superfluous after analyzing flood control on 
the Santa Ana River basin. The untold wealth created from 
extended land use and the drastic increase in property tax revenue 
certainly improved the region.  Flood control allowed the region’s 
economy to shift from primarily agricultural to industrial. The 
defense industry prospered in southern California, bringing with it 
skilled workers.  In fact because the defense industry was so 
critical in southern California flood control became a matter of 
national security.123  During World War II, the Cold War, the 
Korean War, and Vietnam, the United States relied on southern 
California’s defense material and technology output.  If a large 
flood disrupted the defense industry, it could cripple the U.S. 
military and hinder its ability to supply equipment to the troops at 
home and abroad.  
Of course some criticism arises when discussing flood 
control projects. The mere sight of concrete channels and dams 
take away from the beauty of the southern California landscape.  
Mike Davis’s book, Ecology of Fear, argues that flood control was 
a political construct.  “The Los Angeles River- the defining 
landscape of the nineteenth-century city-was sacrificed for the sake 
of emergency work relief, the preservation of industrial land 
values, and a temporary abatement of the flood problem.” 124 
Moreover, flood control benefited wealthy large landowners who 
forced “the natural river into a concrete straitjacket-destroying the 
riparian ecology and precluding use of the riverway as a 
greenbelt.”125 Inversely, in densely populated, flatland areas such 
as Orange County and Los Angeles, unsightly concrete channels 
might be the only option to assist water out of the area rapidly. The 
debate may still continue today, but after the residents of southern 
California and the nation experienced or witnessed the affects of 
the March 1938 flood, perceptions changed. 
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The timing of the March flood was critical.  Since the 
region’s population was large enough to warrant concern about 
flood control, yet was not developed to the size of the 1950’s 
California, a national calamity was averted.  Had the circumstances 
been different, the 1938 flood might have done to southern 
California what Hurricane Katrina did to New Orleans in 2005.  
The March flood marked a turning point in southern California.  
Modern flood control began just before an industrial and 
population explosion occurred.  Those devastated by the flood may 
not agree with such a positive outlook, but future residents should 
be made aware of California’s natural flooding occurrences.  As 
historian Anthony Turhollow wrote, another lesson the March 
flood provided was the need for a permanent disaster agency.  The 
dependence on volunteers became outdated.  “Plans for an 
emergency relief organization began as a result of the 1938 flood 
to cope with sightseers and looters, as well as to provide 
emergency aid.”126 Only sporadic flooding occurred in the wake of 
the major storm that passed through southern California in January 
2010.  The most severe images reported on television were a 
neighborhood in Long Beach submerged in two feet of water:  
enough to cause damage, but nothing compared to prior floods. 
  If comparing rainfall from the past and superimposing it 
on the southern California of today, 2010, one wonders what the 
possible outcome might be.  The rainfall that caused the 1862 flood 
caused insignificant damage, but what if that storm occurred in 
today’s vastly developed area?  The Army Corp believed in the 
1940’s that the structures they built could withstand maximum 
probable floods.  The flood of 1969 proved their calculations 
wrong, which then sparked the construction of the Seven Oaks 
Dam and increase of the Prado Dam’s overall height.  In the past 
decade the Inland Empire has grown tremendously.  That growth 
has caused numerous housing projects and roads covering the bare 
ground with asphalt and concrete, furthermore adding sewers and 
storm drains that ultimately empty into the Santa Ana River.  Since 
severe flooding has not occurred in recent decades, as a result of 
flood control developments, the population may not be aware of 
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the potential of major rainstorms.  Historians need to educate and 
remind the community of the region’s past flood disasters. 
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